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In the Fire Association of Philadelphia case it appeared that it was
the custom of the patrons of the defendant's parking lot to park their
cars wherever space permitted without advising the defendant thereof, and to get them without notifying him except when necessary to
move a car before they could make their exit. It was also the custom
of the patrons to leave their keys either in the cars or upon a keyboard in an office adjacent to the parking yard. The plaintiff car
owner who was familiar with this custom, except that he denied
knowledge of the keyboard, parked his car in the defendant's lot and
left the keys in it. The car was stolen. The defendant lot owner was
found to be a bailee. 47 The court found that inasmuch as the keys
were left in the car, the defendant lot owner had a right to exercise
physical control over the car at his discretion, and, therefore, the requirement of a change of possession had been met. The court, however, did not consider the lot owner's consent 'to said change in
possession. Seemingly, however, the defendant lot owner's consent
could be inferred from the fact that he knew of the custom of his
patrons to leave their keys in the cars, and made no objection.
A review of the cases in the various jurisdictions discloses that
though the courts are ready to find the necessary delivery of a patron's
car to the lot owner with the latter's consent, still the mere presence
of the car in the parking lot is not, in itself, a sufficient delivery to
constitute the lot owner a bailee. Since, however, the cases indicate
that in the majority of instances the parking lot owner either requests
the patron to leave the keys in the car or gives the patron a claim
48
check, statements to the effect that the parking lot owner is a bailee,
though not technically correct, are practically speaking, a fair statement of his status.
WILLIAm F. PODESTA.

HIGHWAYS AND TOLL RoADs.

A short time ago the New York Court of Appeals, by a threeto-four decision, declared illegal a toll placed by the County of Westchester on the Hutchinson River Parkway.' The parkway, the court
held, is part of our highway system, and a toll on a public highway is
violative of Section 54 of the New York Vehicle and Traffic Law.2
-1 The court in the Fire Association case refused to hold the defendant
liable, however, on the ground that the plaintiff owner was contributorily negligent in leaving the keys in the car.
48 See note 7, supra.

I People v. Westchester, 282 N. Y. 224, 2 N.

Y.

VEHICLE AND TRAFFIc LAW

N. E. (2d) -

(1940).

§ 54 provides: "Except as otherwise

provided in this chapter, local authorities shall have no power to pass, enforce
and maintain any ordinance, rule or regulation requiring from any owner of a
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The county, however, nonplussed by this setback, now collects a toll
on the Cross-County Parkway, a connecting highway, which is used3
by the majority of motorists to reach the Hutchinson River Parkway.
In this manner, the county authorities still retain the greater part of
this source of income.
I.

Methods of Road Taxation.

The public is accustomed to the unhampered use of the roads
and highways. 4 The vast network of our highway system will take
the traveler from coast to coast without toll, tariff or tax charge of
any kind for its use. 5 But the problem of providing and financing
these roads, which cost from $10,000 to $100,000 a mile, carries with
it perplexing legal, as well as financial and engineering, problems.
The equitable apportionment of the cost of highways sufficient in
strength to bear the traffic of today, and which wend their way through
sparsely populated regions from city to city, is a problem of nice legal
and political aspects.
The early solution of the problem was by the compulsory labor
of the inhabitants of the immediate neighborhood." Later there came
into being turnpike companies. These companies were licensed by
the state to build and repair roads, and were allowed in return for
and expense to charge a reasonable toll for passage over
their labor
7
the road.

The early roads were little more than footpaths which grew
wider with the introduction of carts and carriages. The road was the
path by or over a man's land taken by him and his neighbors to the
nearest village or church. Since neighbors used paths through each
other's lands, it was felt that it was their collective duty to maintain
these paths.8 In England, surveyors were appointed in each parish
motor vehicle or motor-cycle, or from any operator or chauffeur to whom this
chapter is applicable, any tax, fee, license or permit for the use of public
highways * * *."

3 It is estimated that 60% of the traffic on the Hutchinson River Parkway
comes from the Cross-County Parkway.
4 Spenser's stanza illustrates the age-old attitude of the public toward
tolls:
"And dayly he his wrongs encreaseth more;
For never wight he lets to passe that way,
Over his bridge, albee he rich or poore,
But he him makes his passage-penny pay:
Else he doth hold him backe or beat away."
(The Faerie Queene, bk. 5, canto 2, stanza 6, 11.1-5.)
5 Motor vehicle registration fees are not considered tolls, Carley v. Snook,
281 U. S. 66, 50 Sup. Ct. 204 (1930), nor are gasoline taxes. See Note (1937)
111 A. L. R. 193.
6 COPNALL, THE LAW RELATING TO HIGHWAYS (2d ed. 1912) 2.
7 Northam Bridge Co. v. London and Southampton Ry., 6 M. & W. 428,
151 Eng. Rep. 479 (1840) ; Austerberry v. Oldham Corp., L. R. (1885) 29 Ch.
Div. 750; Midland Ry. v. Walton, L. R. (1886) 17 Q. B. Div. 30.
8 See 6 HOLDSWORTH, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 310.
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to see that the highways were kept in repair. The labor was by the
members of the community or parish. When this labor became compulsory by the Act of 1555 it was termed "statute duty". It bore
this name until 1835 when it was replaced by a charge on the parochial
rates.
The increase in -trade and the resultant increase in traffic both
accelerated the demand for passable roads and placed a heavier burden
on the road itself. As the work of building and maintaining the road
grew more burdensome on the population it became customary in the
17th century for the Parliament by local acts to create turnpikes or
toll roads. These toll roads were usually under the management of
trustees who were appointed for a certain number of years to collect
the toll and use it as a fund for the maintenance and improvement
of the road. By the beginning of the 18th century, most of the main
or trunk roads in England were turnpike roads.9
The character of a road as a turnpike road did not, however,
relieve the population from their obligation of "statute duty" and if
the trustees became insolvent or permitted the road to fall into disrepair, the duty of maintenance devolved upon those who would have
been liable for such repair had there been a free road.10 In 1878
turnpikes were abolished altogether in England."
II.

Road Finance in New York.

The history of road finance in New York has followed a similar
course. Street surveyors were appointed as early as 1647 12 and
provision was made for the regulation of toll roads and toll rates in
1661.' s In the Duke's Laws, conscription of highway labor was provided for and this system continued until the end of English rule.
9See note 6, .upra.
10 This seems to be the law even today. "It is the duty of the citizens to
maintain the road, and in compelling the performance of this duty by authorizing the turnpike company to collect toll the legislature simply changes the
method of collecting from the citizens the expense of maintaing the road and
does not, so it is adjudged, impose upon them any additional burden." 1 ELLIOTT,
ROADS AND STREETS (4th ed. 1926) 103.
11 ENGINEERING AND LoCOMOTivE ACT

1878.

(But many continued to exist

even after the passage of this Act and in 1930 there were still 55 toll roads in
England. 33 LAW NOTES 199 Ja. 1930.)
12 LAws AND ORDINANCES OF NEW NETHERLANDS

1638-1674.

"In order to prevent such damage, a proper and swinging gate shall be
erected at the commencement of the road at the cost of all interested parties,
and always kept closed by a person to be appointed thereto expressly by the
Schout and commissaries; which person shall for the opening and shutting of
the gate recieve from each Bouwery according as he might agree with the
proprietors or occupants, at the discretion of the commissaries, and from others
who pass only now and then through the gate, and therefore do not agree woth
him, one stiver for each opening, two stivers for each freight or pleasure
wagon, and one stiver for each person who sits therein." LAWS AND ORDI13

NANCES OF

NEW

NETHERLANDS

1638-1674.
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The law of 1760 provided that every male over 21 was subject to
work on the highways. 14
The new status of New York as a sovereign state rather than
an English Colony in 1777 produced little change in the system of
highway administration. But at this time the idea of monetary rather
than labor contributions to the upkeep of the highway system had
taken root, and that trend evidenced itself in several legislative enactments of those days. 15 About this time, too, a system of financing
state roads by lotteries was tried.16
The inadequacy of local roads for through travel, led to the erection of a system of turnpike roads which became the first imlortant
combination of improved roads in New York. The toll road flourished from 1750 to 1850 reaching its peak about 1830 when competition and financial distress combined' to cause its downfall. 1 T Many,
however, survived until the beginning of the 20th century. Today
there are few toll roads, probably not more than a few8 hundred of
the three million miles of highways in the United States.'
The expense of highway construction and maintenance is now
borne according to a ratio between the local and state government. 9
At an early date it was realized that the system of maintaining the
highways by local labor and local taxation was inequitable in that it
burdened the inhabitants of villages with the support of busy intercity highways, which were of little benefit to the local community.
In 1898 the Higbee-Armstrong Act providing for a state highway system and state aid to towns was passed. 20 The New York State Department of Highways was established in 1908 21 and today with the
exception of acquiring the right of way the entire cost of constructing
state highways is borne by the state. 22 But the building and maintenance of highways is nevertheless still a serious burden on the local
community. For the average of rural towns in New York more than
one-half of the taxes are for highway purposes. And in spite of various grants from the state in 1930 approximately sixty-three per cent
of the expenditure
of a number of rural counties was for highway
23
purposes.
14 COL. LAWS OF NEW YORK c. 1144.

Is An example is the schedule adopted by Albany County in 1772.
26

N. Y. Laws 1798, c. 26.

17 The panic of 1837 and the consequent lessening of trade was an important factor in the downfall of the toll road.
1s Some of them are listed in note 64, infra.
19 See note 28, infra.
20 N. Y. Laws 1898, c. 115.
21 N. Y. Laws 1908, c. 330.
22 The right of way is acquired at the expense of the county.
23 CURTIs, DEVELOPMENT OF HIGHWAY ADMINISTRATION AND FINANCE IN

NEW YORK (1937)

3.
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III. People v. Westchester.
Of the various attempts by the local governments to find a solution of this problem perhaps the most novel and the most interesting
is that devised by the authorities of the County of Westchester. The
county government being merely an arm of the state has until recently been considered of only minor importance as a unit of highway
administration. 24 Although laws passed in 1893 25 and 1908 26 provided for county roads, it was not until 1914 27 that a workable system was provided. The Law of 1929 28 governs the present county
road system.
Under the Westchester plan, the county, through its Park Commission, purchased a strip of land from Pelham Bay in New York
to the Connecticut border and built thereon a parkway.2 9 The parkway is laid out on virgin territory and was built without state or
federal aid. It is so constructed that it does not cross at grade any
highway or other public road or the right of way of any public utility.
A ten-cent toll was charged for the use of this parkway in accordance
with a local statute.30 The local statute was enacted by the county
under the Home Rule Provision of the State Constitution8 and the
provisions of the Westchester County Charter.82 Section 54 of the
New York Vehicle and Traffic Law provides that "Except as otherwise provided in this chapter local authorities shall have no power to
pass, enforce and maintain any ordinance, rule or regulation requiring
from any owner of a motor vehicle or motor-cycle, or from any operator or chauffeur to whom this chapter is applicable, any tax, fee,
license, or permit for the use of public highways, or exclude such
owner, operator or chauffeur from the free use of such public
highways * * *"

The county contended that this section was not applicable to the
Hutchinson River Parkway for two reasons: first, Section 17 of the
Park Commission Act provides that "The Park Commission shall,
notwithstanding any provision in any general or special law to the
contrary have the exclusive power to adopt and enforce rules, regulations or ordinances governing the use of said park or parks as defined
24

Blood v. Woods, 95 Cal. 78, 30 Pac. 129 (1892).

25 N. Y. Laws 1893, c. 333.
26 N. Y. Laws
27 N. Y. Laws
28 N. Y. Laws
29 The section

1908, c. 330.
1914, c. 61.
1929, c. 362.
of the parkway upon which toll was charged is 16 miles in

length.
30 Local Law No. 5. "An act providing for the collection of tolls on the
Hutchinson River Parkway between the Boston Post Road and Westchester
Avenue in the County of Westchester, authorizing the installation of the necessary toll stations and equipment in connection therewith, and providing for the
disposition of the tolls collected."
31 N. Y. CONST. art. IX, § 4.
32 N. Y. Laws 1937, c. 617, §§ 3, 4, 69.
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herein and traffic in and through the same"; second, the Vehicle and
Traffic Law applied only to highways and not to parkways.
IV.

The Nature of a Parkway.

The distinction between a highway and a parkway is at most a
control of the
slender one. A parkway, although usually under the
33
is more in
park commission, is not generally regarded as a park but
34
However,
the nature of a boulevard or highway through a park.
the distinction is of great importance here, for had the court decided
that this parkway was not a highway the right of the county to col5
lect the toll would have been upheld.3 A municipal corporation in
-perating park facilities acts in a proprietary and not in a govern3
mental capacity, and a charge for the use of such facilities is common. 1
The name given to a road is immaterial. Its nature is determined by its real effect and not by its name. 37 If the public has the
right to use the way at pleasure and indiscriminately it is held to be
a public one. 38 The fact that a statute provides for its construction
and maintenance by a private person is not conclusive against its
being for public use.39 Section 2 of the New York Vehicle and Traffic
Law as amended in 1930 defines a public highway as follows:
"'Public highway' shall include any highway, road, street, avenue,
public driveway or any other public way."
This is not the first time the Court of Appeals has been called
upon to determine the nature of this parkway. In Matter of County
of Westchester (Hutchinson River Parkway)40 the court held that
the Hutchinson River Parkway was not a "street, avenue, highway or
road" within the meaning of Section 90 of the Railroad Law which
provides, in part, that "where a new street, avenue, highway, or road
* * * or a state or county highway * * *, shall hereinafter be con-

structed across a steam surface railroad * * * (it) shall pass over or
under such railroad wherever such construction is practicable. Notice
of intention * * * shall be given such railroad corporation by the
33 Municipal Securities Corp. v. Kansas City, 265 Mo. 252, 177 S. W. 856
(1915) ; Kupelian v. Andrews, 233 N. Y. 278, 135 N. E. 502 (1922) ; Village of
Grosse Pointe Shores v. Ayres, 254 Mich. 58, 235 N. W. 829 (1931).
34 Bouis v. City of Baltimore, 138 Md. 284, 113 Atl. 852 (1921) ; cf. Chaplin v. Kansas City, 259 Mo. 479, 168 S. W. 763 (1914).
35 "Once it becomes manifest that the Hutchinson River Parkway is a
public highway, then a reading of § 54 of the Vehicle and Traffic Law indicates
that the passage of any such law as Local Law No. 5 is proscribed." Conway,
J., in People v. Westchester, 228 N. Y. 224, 231, - N. E. (2d) - (1940).
36 Augustine v. Town of Brant, 249 N.-Y. 198, 163 N. E. 732 (1928).
37 Sherman v. Buick, 32 Cal. 242 (1867); Logan v. Stogsdale, 123 Ind.
372, 24 N. E. 135 (1890).
38 Chesapeake Stone Co. v. Moreland, 126 Ky. 656, 104 S. W. 762 (1907);
Welton v. Dickson, 38 Neb. 767, 57 N. W. 559 (1894); Cozard v. Kanawha
Hardwood Co., 139 N. C. 283, 51 S. E. 932 (1905).
39 Fanning v. Gilliland, 37 Ore. 369, 61 Pac. 636 (1900).
40246 N. Y. 314, 158 N. E. 881 (1927).
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municipal corporation etc :". No definition of "street, avenue, highway, or road" is given in the Act. The court held that these words
meant conventional streets in cities or villages and did not apply to a
parkway. A parkway is included within the term park in the Westchester Park Act. With this in mind the court said "It is a park." 41
In Westchester
Electric Railroad Co. v. Westchester County Park
Commission 42 the court repeated these words with approval. That
was an action to enforce an agreement between the Park Commission
and a railroad company whereby the Commission agreed to reimburse
the railroad company for the expense of removing and relocating its
structures when the removal was made necessary by the construction
of this parkway. The question was whether or not the Park Commission had the power to make such a contract. Such authority was
found in a statute the headnote of which reads, in part, "An act to
provide for the location, creation, acquisition and improvement of
parks, parkways, and boulevards in and by the county of Westchester." 43 The validity of the agreement was decided upon the basis
of this statute and the reference to the parkway as a park was not
necessary to the determination of the case.
In People v. Westchester,44 however, the parkway was held
to be a public highway under Section 2 of the Vehicle and Traffic
Law. The court reasoned that since such a road was expressly
made a highway under this section before the 1930 amendment45
it was certainly one within the broader phrasing of the statute
since the amendment 46 and that "Landscaping the right of way does
not make an ordinary park out of what is essentially a highway." 47
* * * "The test", the court continued, "would appear to be whether
the public has a general right of passage in motor vehicles. If it have,
then that is the measuring rod to be applied under the statute in determining the right of the public to the free use of all public passages
or ways, however they may be termed." 48
These decisions are not inconsistent, and one does not overrule
the other. Taken together they stand for the proposition that where
a statute uses the word highway to mean "conventional streets in
cities and villages" it does not include a parkway; but where a statute
defines the term highway to include "any public way", a parkway is
a highway within its terms.
In its endeavor to distinguish the cases, the court takes pains to
4 Id.at 318, N. E. at 882.
42255 N. Y. 297, 174 N. E. 660 (1931).
43 N. Y. Laws 1922, c. 292, § 5.
44 282 N. Y. 224, - N. E. (2d) - (1940).
"5"'Public highway' shall include any highway, county road, county highway, state highway, state road, public street, avenue, alley, park, parkway or
public place in any county, city, borough, town or village in this state."
46 "'Public highway' shall include any highway, road, street, avenue, alley,
public place, public driveway or any other public way."
47282 N. Y. 224, - N. E. (2d) - (1940).
48 282 N. Y. 224, 231, - N. E. (2d) - (1940).
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point out that at the time In Matter of the County of Westchester
(Hutchinson River Parkway) and Westchester Electric Co. v. Westchester County Park Commission were decided the road extensions
had not been added to the northerly and the southerly ends of the
parkway. And that "The language of th opinion (Matter of County
of Westchester) did not establish or fix the then conditions so as to
make them unchangeable and may not now be held applicable to entirely different ones." It is submitted, however, that the court by
this language did not intend to weaken the ruling of Sebring v. Quackenbush,49 Matter of Central ParkwayP, Brooklyn Park Commissioner
v. Armstrong,5' and other such cases which hold that where a park
has been lawfully created its legal character cannot be changed by
diverting it to other uses except by legislative warrant. But rather
the court meant that the parkway, although included in the term
"park" under the Westchester Park Act, was, nevertheless, at all
times, a highway under Section 2 of the Vehicle and Traffic Law.
V. Power to Collect Toll on a Public Road.
It has been held that all roads which the Legislature has the
power to lay out and establish are public roads.5 2 But had the road
been laid out by a private person the decision would probably have
been no different. It is generally held that a turnpike cannot be created even wholly on private land without a franchise from the state
if the road is available to the use of the general public upon the payment of the toll.53 The reasons for this use have not been made clear.
It has been held that the establishment of a road plus the offering of
its use indiscriminately upon the payment of the toll, effect a dedication of the road to the public and54that the easement of the public is
entire and not subject to the toll.

It has been submitted that there might be a dedication subject
to a toll. At one time there seems to have been considerable doubt
on this point. In Austerberry v. Oldham Corporation55 the court
said, per Cotton, L. J., "Now I here give no opinion as to whether
there can be a dedication by an individual of a road as a highway
subject to a toll without the aid of an Act of Parliament. Authorities were cited containing some passages apparently to the effect that
this might be done", 5 6 and per Lindly, L. J., "I think it is very doubt49 120 Misc. 609, 199 N. Y. Supp. 245 (1923), aff'd, 214 App. Div. 758,
209 N. Y. Supp. 918 (1925).
50 140 Misc. 727, 251 N. Y. Supp. 577 (1931).
5145

N. Y. 234 (1871).

Sherman v. Buick, 32 Cal. 242 (1867).
53 "Turnpike roads established by a corporation, under authority of law,
are public highways, and the right to exact toll from those using them comes
from the state creating the corporation." Covington & L. Tpk. Co. v. Sandford,
164 U. S. 578, 594, 17 Sup. Ct. 198 (1896).
54 26 R. C. L. (1920) p. 1401, § 7.
55 L. R. (1885) 29 Ch. Div. 750.
56 Id. at 770.
52
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ful, but it is unnecessary to decide whether it is possible to dedicate
to the public a highway subject to a toll. I do not say it is not, but
I am very far from saying that it is. But whatever doubt there may
be upon that point, which, if we had to decide it, I should like to investigate further, it appears to me impossible to hold that a highway
is dedicated to the public subject to a toll which may fluctuate from
day to day. This highway was constructed under a trust deed giving
the trustees a power to levy tolls if they liked, and to change them
whenever they liked; and it appears to me quite impossible not to see
that this is not a dedication to the public-it is liberty to such of the
public as chose to pay the toll to use the road-that is all." 57 Later
the law became well settled that such a dedication could not be made
and a learned jurist in upholding the doctrine that there could be no
such dedication said, "For no greater evil could well be imagined
than the unrestrained power on the part of individuals to exact from
the traveler, who cannot brook delay or stipulate for terms, whatever
cupidity might dictate." 5 s
A turnpike differs from a public highway only in that while a
highway is constructed at public expense, the turnpike is constructed
at the expense of individuals and the cost of construction and maintenance is reimbursed by a toll levied by the state. 59 The acceptance
of a franchise effects a dedication of the road to the public.60 The
public character of the easement is more clearly seen when the statute
provides for the condemnation of property to obtain the right of way.
A dictum in Matter of Westchester (Hutchinson River Parkway),
to the effect that the paths and driveways may be changed from time
to time, or such paths and driveways may be wholly closed as in the
judgment of the officials in charge of the park may seem desirable,
would seem to be overruled by People v. Westchester and it is submitted that such power could not be exercised by the officials in view
of the holding of this later case.
VI. Power of a County to Collect a Toll.
At common law a county had no right to levy a toll on a public
road without a state franchise, and even under the Home Rule Provision of the State Constitution this power is not granted. 61 The
county in its argument to the Court of Appeals relied upon the case
of Robia Holding Co. v. Walker.62 Thiere the court held that although
no express grant of power to the City of New York to levy tolls on
5

Id. at 779.

58 Tuckee & T. Turnpike Road Co. v. Campbell, 44 Cal. 89 (1872) ; Bartram v. Central Tpk. Co., 25 Cal. 283 (1864). HALE, Da- JuRIS MARIS, c. 3:

"No man can take a settled or constant toll, even in his own private land, for a
common passage, without the King's license."
59 See note 7, sapra.
6026 R. C. L. (1920) p. 1401, §7.
N. E. (2d) - (1940).
61 People v. Westchester, 282 N. Y. 224, 62257 N. Y. 431, 178 N. E. 747 (1931).

ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW

[ VOL. 14

the Triborough Bridge had been given, such power was granted by
implication to the city under its Home Rule power. Although the
court in People v. Westchester does not attempt to distinguish these
cases a distinction is to be noted. The Robia case differs from
People v. Westchester principally in that there is no law in the State of
New York restricting the placing of63toll on bridges similar to Section
54 of the Vehicle and Traffic Law.
The decision in People v. Westchester does not preclude a county
from charging toll for the use of its roads but holds that the county
has no right to collect a toll without obtaining a franchise from the
state. Therefore, in the case of the Cross-County Parkway where
has been obtained the county may continue to collect
such franchise
04
its toll.

Were a franchise to collect a toll on the Hutchinson River Parkway to be obtained from the Legislature, such grant would be valid
and the county could collect the toll, even though the public had been
using the road as a free highway before the power was conferred, for
the law is well settled that the State Legislature may impose a toll on
that power to6 7a private inexisting roads and that it may delegate
66
dividual, 65 a municipal corporation, or a road district.
The only exception to the right of a state to impose such a toll
is under Section 9 of the Federal Highway Act where federal aid
has been granted. 68
HUGH PETER MULLEN.
63

N. Y. GEN. CITY LAW § 79 is so limited by § 80 as not to apply.

64 Other parkways upon which toll is now authorized are the Jones Beach,

Pelham Bay-Port Chester, and Hendrick Hudson Parkways (N. Y. Laws 1933,
c. 68, §3(10); c. 70, §3(10); N. Y. Laws 1934, c. 138, §3e).
65 Blood v. McCarty, 112 Cal. 561, 44 Pac. 1025 (1896).
66 Robia Holding Co. v. Walker, 257 N. Y. 431, 178 N. E. 747 (1931).
67 State v. Overseas Road & Toll Bridge Dist., 125 Fla. 481, 170 So. 109
(1936).
The cases of Blood v. Woods, 95 Cal. 78, 30 Pac. 129 (1892) and Blood v.
McCarty, 112 Cal. 561, 44 Pac. 1025 (1896) are here in point. In Blood v.
Woods it was held that the board of supervisors of a county had no authority
to grant a franchise to collect tolls upon a free public road. A state act was
then passed which provided that the county board of supervisors should have
jurisdiction and power to grant licenses and franchises for taking tolls on public
roads or highways "whenever, in their judgment, the expense necessary to
operate and maintain such roads or highways as free public highways is too
great to justify the county in so operating or maintaining them". In Blood v.
McCarty the statute was attacked as an unconstitutional delegation of power.
The court upheld the statute saying, "The power of the legislature over the
highways of the state is adequate to secure their establishment, maintenance,
and discontinuance, and this power may be exercised through the instrumentality
of subordinate bodies such as the county board of supervisors. If the legislature
may allow the taking of tolls as compensation for building a road, it seems
necessarily to follow that it may allow a like franchise as compensation for
keeping it in repair, which is the purport of the statute now under view, and
such is the rule, although the result may be to take away a previous right in
the public to pass toll free."
68 42 STAT. 214 (1921), 23 U. S. C. A. § 9 (1927).

